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 Gerald Postema offers a gentle but damning critique of contemporary analytic 
jurisprudence for being anti-social, anti-philosophical, ahistorical, and, ultimately, 
mistaken not only about the province of jurisprudence but the nature of law. He also 
offers an elegant restatement of what jurisprudence with a wider ambition must be like; 
and it is a jurisprudence in which time and history are central.1 
 Postema’s basic diagnosis is that analytic jurisprudence accepts a peculiarly 
narrowing premise of Austin’s: that the province of jurisprudence – by which Austin 
meant the subject-matter it studies – is solely the “core concepts of the professional 
practice of law—concepts of legal right and duty, possession, ownership, liability, fault, 
person, thing, status, intention, will, motive, legal sources, legislation, precedent, custom 
and the like.”2 Although Hart and his successors in the Anglo-American tradition mostly 
reject Austin’s definition of law as commands backed by threats, and not all are 
positivists, Postema believes they retain Austin’s narrow understanding of the province of 
jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is the province of legal concepts used in professional 
practice, which turn out to be well-suited for the tools and intellectual style of analytic 
philosophy. A broad understanding of law in its social, economic, cultural, religious, 
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political, and historical dimensions largely vanishes from jurisprudence so conceived.3 
Analytic jurisprudence becomes unsociable, not only to the social sciences, but also to 
the ambition of genuine philosophy, famously defined by Wilfrid Sellars as the endeavor 
to understand “how things in the broadest sense of the term hang together in the broadest 
sense of the term.”4 Postema goes so far as to call analytic jurisprudence “philosophy-
phobic.”5 This is an important point, because it makes it clear that Postema’s complaint is 
not the familiar realist and law-and-society call for replacing jurisprudence with 
something more scientific – a view that Postema rejects because it “effaces any ambition 
of a truly critical theoretical perspective on legal practice.”6 The realists wanted less 
philosophy in jurisprudence, where Postema wants more. 
Postema levels an additional complaint against analytic jurisprudence, directly 
related to the theme of this conference. Analytical jurisprudence largely ignores the 
history of law, and also the history of jurisprudence – two different, if related, points. Its 
most distinctive intellectual style consists of drawing distinctions, formulating precisely-
worded principles, and testing them against linguistic and moral intuitions; but Postema 
objects that “[p]hilosophy that proceeds primarily by plumbing and pumping intuitions is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This complaint is reminiscent of Felix Cohen’s, in Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach, 35 COLUMB. L. REV. 809 (1935), which begins by mocking the “heaven of legal concepts,” 
where “one met, face to face, the many concepts of jurisprudence in their absolute purity, freed from all 
entangling alliances with human life.” Id. at 809. Cohen adds: “The boundless opportunities of this heaven 
of legal concepts were open to all properly qualified jurists, provided only that they drank the Lethean 
draught which induced forgetfulness of terrestrial human affairs. But for the most accomplished jurists the 
Lethean draught was entirely superfluous. They had nothing to forget.” Id. It is important to see that 
Postema’s complaint differs importantly from the realist critique of legal concepts as “transcendental 
nonsense.” The realists were reductionists who wanted to analyze legal propositions functionally, as 
obliquely-phrased predictions of judicial behavior. Postema is anti-reductionist. 
4 Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION, AND REALITY 1 
(1963).  
5 Postema, Jurisprudence, at ms p. 9. 
6 Id. at 27. See note 3, supra. 
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inevitably and uncritically in thrall to the present.”7 More specifically, Postema accuses 
analytic jurisprudence of confining its attention to time-slice legal systems, that is, legal 
systems as they exist at a given moment of time, and he argues that this ahistorical 
procedure “can offer very little illumination of law and legal practice.”8 
Postema offers two general programmatic suggestions for jurisprudence besides 
greater historical consciousness: sociability and synechism. Sociability, as suggested 
above, has two dimensions. First, it means interdisciplinarity – a continual dialogue with 
the study of legal phenomena by the sciences, humanities, and even theology. Second, it 
means embedding jurisprudence in general philosophy, which in Sellars’s words 
encompasses “not only ‘cabbages and kings’, but numbers and duties, possibilities and 
finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death.”9 
Synechism is a less familiar idea, drawn from the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. It is 
the commitment to seek continuity among phenomena. Continuity-seeking may sound 
like another version of sociability, but as I understand it, synechism is a much more 
specific and theory-laden requirement. Peirce was metaphysically committed to the 
existence of actual continua everywhere in nature, history, and human psychology. So 
synechism will impose a certain demand on all systematic studies, namely discerning 
those continua. In particular, synechism commits us to a certain kind of historiography: 
the historian’s job is to unearth continuities between past and present rather than studying 
ruptures. This, it seems to me, is a contestable commitment that rules out a great deal of 
important historical work.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Postema, Jurisprudence, ms p. 20. 
8 Id. at 17, n. 48. 
9 Sellars, supra note 4, at 1. 
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Furthermore, Peirce understood synechism to imply that ideas are intrinsically 
temporal and historical phenomena. Although Postema does not endorse this general 
thesis, he does argue for a special case of it, namely that law is “intrinsically temporal.”10 
This conclusion is central to his argument against the possibility of time-slice legal 
systems. It too is contestable; but, I shall suggest, Postema can reach his conclusion on 
grounds other than synechism, and I agree with him about law’s intrinsic temporality. 
 Before discussing law’s temporality and synechism, I offer two more general 
remarks about Postema’s complaints against analytic jurisprudence. 
Unsociability and Analytic Philosophy 
 The complaint about unsociability rings true. It is apparent in the daily life of law 
schools, which by and large are sociable places. Legal scholars tackle subjects from a 
variety of disciplines, and in my own experience they are open to, and even enthusiastic 
about, good scholarship from other disciplines. Sometimes they don’t fully understand it 
– to take an obvious example, nobody without advanced training in mathematics can read 
the technical appendix to a law and economics paper. Sometimes, they lack the 
background to be critical. And sometimes they cannibalize work from other disciplines 
into their own in an amateurish way, which carries significant costs when the amateur 
version oversimplifies and then goes viral in other people’s scholarship. But these are 
minor complaints compared with the major virtue of sociability that Postema rightly 
emphasizes. It is on display every week in the faculty workshop. 
 But then comes the analytic jurisprudence colleague’s turn at the faculty 
workshop, and, for better or for worse, nobody outside the discipline can figure out what 
the lessons learned might be or why anyone except another analytic jurisprudent should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Postema, Jurisprudence, at 16. 
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care. When the philosopher explains that she is offering an “account” of the concept 
under analysis that significantly improves over Professor A’s account and Professor B’s 
account, it only makes things worse, because nobody knows what an “account” is 
supposed to be or why having one is desirable. 
 Arguably, this problem originated in the classical project of analytic philosophy, 
which from Frege and Russell on was showing how concepts in the special sciences or 
everyday life could be analyzed as logical constructs of terms within some favored base 
vocabulary. Can all mathematical objects be defined in terms of sets? Can all observation 
statements be rewritten (at least in principle) as complex concatenations of sense data? 
As the name itself suggests, analytic philosophy was supposed to generate analytic truths 
connecting conceptual targets with a base vocabulary possessing unimpeachable 
credentials. An analysis of this sort is, more or less, what classical analytic philosophers 
meant by an “account” of a concept (though they were more likely to use the word 
“analysis” than “account”), and the purpose of an account is to help us weed out sense 
from nonsense by recasting arguments in a regimented language where fallacies and 
equivocations are obvious. But to legal scholars to whom keeping an ontologically kosher 
kitchen does not matter, the enterprise of devising accounts of concept X in terms of 
concept Y has no point unless concept Y is convenient to work with, and, furthermore, 
that translating X-talk into Y-talk can be done effortlessly in practice, rather than merely 
demonstrated in principle. 
 By the mid-1950s, Quine, Sellars, and Wittgenstein had demolished key premises 
about language and knowledge that motivated the classical analytic project; in this sense, 
at any rate, the classical project died young, and philosophy went post-analytic six 
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decades ago.11 But the enterprise of analyzing obscure concepts in terms of concepts 
supposedly less obscure, along with a style of argument based on precise definitions, 
fine-grained distinctions, thought-experiments, and suspicion of big unscientific ideas 
continues to dominate. The aim is to promote clear thinking; but to outsiders, the 
enterprise can seem more like an obstacle than an aid, the intellectual equivalent of red 
tape that keeps you from doing business because the Bureau of Warranted Concepts 
won’t issue a permit. 
 There is an additional and nationally specific reason for the insularity of analytic 
jurisprudence within U.S. law schools: the prevailing Englishness of a discipline whose 
writings often seem like planets orbiting a foreign sun named H. L. A. Hart. This is in no 
way to denigrate the importance and excellence of The Concept of Law, or to suggest that 
it is unworthy of the vast intelligence analytic jurisprudents have expended on it and its 
theoretical competitors. The problem is simply that Hart’s book doesn’t touch, to any 
noticeable degree, the theoretical debates growing out of the specifically American legal 
experience. Most U.S. legal academics came to their prevailing positivism via another 
route – a crooked path that runs from legal realism and pragmatism through today’s 
textualism (notwithstanding that textualism and realism disagree about nearly everything 
except the positivist proposition that there is no law but positive law).12 Natural law in 
U.S. legal discourse comes cloaked in the positive-law guise of the U.S. Constitution, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951), attacked the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic truths and the reduction of empirical knowledge to logical constructs of immediate 
experiences. Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION, AND 
REALITY, supra note 4, further undermined reductionism, and LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (1953) broadly attacked the representational view of language underlying the classical 
project. 
12 Postema’s comprehensive study of twentieth-century Anglophone jurisprudence concurs: he divides it 
into two mostly non-intersecting tracks, one deriving from Hart and the other from Holmes. GERALD J. 
POSTEMA, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (2011). On the 
“Holmesian” track, see especially chapters 2 and 3. 
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taken as a totem for veneration, not in the guise of “morality.” And whatever residual 
anti-positivism we find in the mainstream U.S. legal academy likely derives from the 
legal process theory of the other Hart (Henry not Herbert), from pragmatism of the sort 
favored by Richard Posner, or even from law and economics, none of which resembles 
the traditional natural law that was H. L. A. Hart’s target.13 In American Jurisprudence 
Through English Eyes, Hart himself seemed to recognize that U.S. legal theory responds 
to different problems (namely, problems about the judicial role) than his concerns about 
the rule of recognition, officialdom, and the separation of law and morality.14 More 
specifically, U.S. legal theory centers on problems of judicial role in the divided 
government of an administrative federal state. Indirectly, these are problems growing 
from the U.S. experiences of race and capitalism – for race and regulation are the 
contexts in which judicial activism became a public political issue. Tellingly, Ronald 
Dworkin is the only contemporary analytic jurisprudent with whom U.S. legal scholars 
outside the discipline regularly engage. Dworkin’s jurisprudence is judge-and-Court-
centered,15 and his topical essays tackle distinctively U.S. debates over liberty versus 
equality, free speech, and religion.16 He is, if anything, further proof that our legal solar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See, e.g., Posner’s dissenting opinion in U.S. v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1996)(Posner J. 
dissenting), describing “the disagreement between the severely positivistic view that the content of law is 
exhausted in clear, explicit, and definite enactments … and the natural lawyer’s or legal pragmatist’s view 
that the practice of interpretation and the general terms of the Constitution (such as ‘equal protection of the 
laws’) authorize judges to enrich positive law with the moral values and practical concerns of civilized 
society.” The legal pragmatist, of course, is Posner himself – see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic 
Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1996). The version of natural law Posner has in mind is probably 
Dworkin’s version. See Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural Law” Revisited, 34 Fla. L. Rev. 165 (1982). 
14 H. L. A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 
Ga. L. Rev. 969 (1977).  
15 For Dworkin, legal philosophy is “the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law.” 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 90 (1986). 
16 However, as Postema notes, Dworkin too “seems to share the amnesia of the history of the discipline 
characteristic of the Hart-sources stream.” Private communication, Dec. 11, 2014 (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review). 
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system revolves around native suns, and it is closely keyed to the various revolutions in 
U.S. history rather than the problems Hart investigated. 
Must Philosophy Be Comprehensive? 
 Notwithstanding my complaints about conceptual analysis, I think an analytic 
jurisprudent might reasonably reject Postema’s requirement on what the subject must 
look like. Postema writes that “seeking comprehensive explanations is the ambition of 
philosophical jurisprudence.”17 What if an analytic philosopher denies that “comprehensive 
explanations” must be the ambition? What if that philosopher prefers to work on discrete 
bounded problems, for example causation in tort or the theory of criminal defenses? That 
choice seems like a matter of temperament, not a matter of right and wrong ways to study the 
law. The same difference in temperament crops up across fields of study. It clearly crops up 
in history, where a first-rate historian might devote years to a single decade of the English 
civil war without ever aspiring to the grand synthesis of a Bloch or a Braudel. As another 
example, a much-discussed essay by the mathematician Timothy Gowers warns that within 
pure mathematics the gulf between problem solvers and theory builders has become a two-
cultures divide as dangerous (for mathematicians) as C. P. Snow’s divide between the 
cultures of science and letters.18 Gowers observes that contemporary mathematics tilts toward 
theory building and the sub-specialties that lend themselves to theory building; in the face of 
this trend, he defends the dignity of problem solving and the worth of the mathematical 
specialties that problem solvers favor. Gowers insists that the insights that go into tackling a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Postema, Jurisprudence, ms. p. 19. Again: “Philosophical jurisprudence, first, seeks fundamental 
comprehensive explanations that propose to understand phenomena of law as an integral aspect of human 
social life and human experience.” Id. at 24. 
18 W. T. Gowers, The Two Cultures of Mathematics, in MATHEMATICS: FRONTIERS AND PERSPECTIVES 65 
(V. I. Arnold, Michael Atiyah, Peter D. Lax, and Barry Mazur eds., 2000), available at 
https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~wtg10/2cultures.pdf (accessed Sept. 6, 2014). 
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problem are no less capable of changing the way mathematicians think than a grand theorem 
uniting two areas of mathematics.19 
 My point is not to equate analytic jurisprudence with problem solving rather than 
theory building. Many analytic philosophers, in law and elsewhere, build systematic theories, 
some of which are vast in scope. My point is rather to echo Gowers’s caution against 
thinking there is something second-rate about analytic problem solving.  
Melody 
 Postema’s argument about law and history is based on an argument about law and 
time, according to which law is “intrinsically temporal”20 in the way that melody is. In one 
sense, of course, everything earthly is intrinsically temporal; but Postema is pointing to the 
special sense in which a melody stopped in time would no longer be a melody at all.21 I 
would put it this way: One of the defining elements of melody is its rhythm, which is a 
temporal succession of notes and rests of defined relative duration. Take away time and 
rhythm disappears; the notes collapse into a chord. A time-slice of a melody is in this sense a 
contradiction in terms, because once you make the time-slice, what you have bears no 
resemblance to melody. 
 It is not obvious that law is like this. A rule of contract law – for example, the 
mailbox rule – does not on the face of it share the property that its components succeed each 
other in time. If you begin to play a melody at 3 p.m. and ask what it sounds like 3.4 seconds 
later, the answer will be either a tone or a rest, C# or silence. If you ask what the mailbox rule 
is at 3.4 seconds past 3 p.m., the answer is that it is the mailbox rule. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id. at 6-8 (of the on-line version). Gowers’s example is a proof by the legendary problem solver Paul 
Erdös, who with great ingenuity showed how to introduce probabilistic arguments in unexpected ways into 
new fields of mathematics. Id. at 6. On Erdös, see PAUL HOFFMAN, THE MAN WHO KNEW ONLY NUMBERS: 
THE STORY OF PAUL ERDÖS AND THE SEARCH FOR MATHEMATICAL TRUTH (1999). 
20 Postema, Jurisprudence, at 16. 
21 In Postema’s words, time is an existence condition of everything, but it is of the essence of melody. Id. at 
15. 
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Indeed, laws can seem less temporal than extra-legal human affairs. A statute comes 
into force abruptly at a specified time and date, and remains in force in the same form 
until it is amended, repealed, replaced, or rejected as unconstitutional. We can search 
official records to find out what the original version of the statute said, exactly when it 
was amended, exactly when the amended version was next amended, and so on. The data 
base will say something like “2006—Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 109-366, §6(b)(1)(A), added 
par. (3) and struck out former par. (3) which reads as follows: …”22 Black letter law 
seems chopped into discrete temporal bits. They succeed each other, but each bit remains 
constant until the next bit comes along. If human affairs may be represented as a system 
in continual motion, like the Earth’s winds, black letter law seems more like stop-frame 
animation or even like beads on a string. This difference raises the question of what 
Postema has in mind by his analogy of law with melody. 
In an earlier paper on which he draws, Postema elaborates the metaphor. “Music, 
melody in particular, is an ordering of time.”23 To hear a melody as melody is to hear its 
parts in relation to a temporally extended whole, and this awareness itself takes place in 
time (and not, Postema explains, “from some point outside the temporal process”24). It 
involves the listener projecting what she has just heard into what is to come—and, if the 
melody takes an unexpected twist, re-integrating what has already been heard into a 
different totality. Listening to music is, in this sense, holistic. Postema next argues that 
individual intentions, which he understands as partial and indeterminate plans, share this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I have chosen, more or less randomly, the note to 18 U.S.C. §2441, the federal war crimes statute. 
23 Gerald J. Postema, Melody and Law’s Mindfulness of Time, 17 RATIO JURIS 203, 207 (2004)[hereinafter: 
Melody]. Cf. Stravinsky’s dictum, “Music is the best means we have of digesting time.” IGOR STRAVINSKY 
& ROBERT CRAFT, RETROSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS 149 (1969). 
24 Postema, Melody, at 208. These two standpoints correspond roughly with what philosophers of time call 
the “A-series” (past, present, future), which is indexed to some temporal being’s now, and the “B-series” 
(September 18, September 19, September 20), which orders events temporally without indexing them to a 
privileged now. Postema’s point is that human awareness of time is ineluctably A-series awareness. 
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same holistic mindfulness of time: plans project both forward and backward into time.25 
And so does law, understood as a method of normatively guiding social interaction.26 
Normativity requires both citizens and officials to incorporate law into intentions and 
plans, and as we have just seen, these require coherence over time. Thus, Postema 
concludes, “the normative coherence of momentary legal systems is derivative, 
depending entirely on their coherence over time.”27 He therefore rejects the beads-on-a-
string view of law, or, as he puts it, the view that “the identity of a legal system over time 
is a function of identity-maintaining links among momentary segments of the legal 
system.”28 Momentary segments taken by themselves have no normative authority – a 
powerful argument, in my opinion. 
 Although Postema is talking about entire legal systems, a similar argument might 
be made about individual rules. Returning to my example of black letter law, notice that 
even written statutes and constitutional provisions are continually being interpreted by 
both citizens and officials, and therefore the beads on a string are not quite as internally 
changeless as the model suggests. Consider, for example, the Equal Protection Clause 
(EPC) of the U.S. Constitution. Under its original meaning, it was a guarantee that 
government would protect everyone, not solely white people, against illegal violence, 
private or public.29 After U.S. v. Cruikshank, the EPC protected only against state action, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Id. Here he adopts the analysis of intention offered by Bratman, citing MICHAEL BRATMAN, FACES OF 
INTENTION (1999). Postema wrote the paper I am discussing before the publication of Shapiro’s Legality, 
which also understands law in terms of Bratman’s linkage of intentions and plans, although Shapiro does 
not emphasize law’s temporality. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2013). 
26 Postema, Melody, at 223. 
27 Id. 
28 Id., at 221. 
29 JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 116-34 (1965). 
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not private action, although nothing in its wording had changed.30 In Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court found that the EPC forbids race segregation in public schools; 
half a century later, the Court found that the EPC forbids race desegregation in public 
schools.31 The language of the EPC remains constant but its interpretation does not, and the 
normative guidance that the EPC offers is in flux. 
 Postema generalizes this point beyond judicial interpretation when he claims that law 
is recursive, meaning that how citizens and officials understand law’s directives – call this 
their “uptake” – shapes legal rules themselves.32 It is easy to misunderstand his point. 
Postema does not mean that current understandings of the law will influence future rule 
changes and interpretations. That is true but trivial. He means something bigger: that citizen 
and official uptake determine what the rules are now. On his view there is no Archimedean 
point like original intent or meaning that fixes the rules.33 That is because law is a recursive 
normative practice.  
Postema seems to adhere to a “meaning as use” theory of legal linguistic meaning, in 
which the normative practice of the relevant community determines the semantics of legal 
rules. As Robert Brandom, the leading contemporary exponent of this view of language, puts 
it, “the process of applying concepts in judgment, and their rational integration with one 
another … [is also] the process of determining the content of those concepts.”34 Brandom 
explicitly models his view of language on judicial decision-making according to precedent, in 
which “the judge is extracting material inferential consequences from [prior adjudicators’] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.” U.S. v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876). 
31 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747 
(2007)(basing the rejection of race-conscious remedies on Brown). 
32 Postema, Jurisprudence, ms. at 16-17. 
33 Postema, Melody, at 218 (rejecting originalism). 
34 ROBERT B. BRANDOM, REASON IN PHILOSOPHY 84 (2009)(emphases in original). 
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commitments …, but … also … developing and determining the conceptual contents … that 
in turn constrain the process going forward.”35 
 This pragmatist and Hegelian view of linguistic meaning is by no means 
uncontroversial. It offers itself as a rival to mainstream theories holding that the meaning of a 
sentence is given by the conditions under which it is true. Brandom and Quine argue that the 
mainstream theories err by modeling natural language on formal languages. In the latter, 
symbols are assigned meaning in advance of their use in theory-building and belief-formation, 
and only by stipulating concepts in advance are we able to state truth conditions. In natural 
language, by contrast, we fix meaning in medias res by using concepts in making claims and 
drawing inferences.36 Language and belief arise together with no in-principle demarcation 
between change in language and change in belief, and they evolve together in a process that – 
as Postema argues – is essentially historical and time-minded. Contestable as this theory of 
meaning may be, I agree with it, and I believe it is implicit in Postema’s arguments and 
conclusions. 
Synechism 
 I am less confident about synechism, “a methodological inclination favoring 
explanations that focus on continuities.”37 As mentioned above, the term originates in the 
writing of Peirce, who defined it as “the tendency to regard everything as continuous.”38 
Peirce believed that all ideas have fuzzy edges, that is, real continuities with their neighbors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Id., at 85 (emphases in original). 
36 Id., at 83. 
37 Postema, Jurisprudence, ms. at 22. 
38 C. S. Peirce, Immortality in the Light of Synechism [hereinafter: Immortality], in 2 The Essential Peirce: 
Selected Philosophical Writings (1893-1913) 1 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds. 1998). Peirce did 
not restrict synechism to a single domain: “Surely no reader will suppose that this principle is intended to 
apply only to some phenomena and not to others – only, for instance, to the little province of matter and not 
to the rest of the great empire of ideas.” Id. at 2. 
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that, by definition, are different ideas.39 In his philosophy of mathematics, Peirce believed in 
the existence of actual infinitesimals and maintained that reasoning with infinitesimals is 
mathematically preferable to reasoning with limits (a view that few contemporary 
mathematicians share).40 That allowed him to conclude that the sum of the angles of a 
triangle is not 180o “but only that it equals that quantity plus or minus some quantity which is 
excessively small for all the triangles we can measure.”41 Similarly, rather than saying that 
space has three dimensions, we should say only that any movements out of three dimensions 
are excessively small.42 Proceeding from these mathematical speculations, Peirce next argued 
that the boundary between a red surface and an adjacent blue surface is infinitesimal in width 
and is half red and half blue; analogously, “what is present to the mind at any ordinary instant, 
is what is present during a moment in which that instant occurs. Thus, the present is half past 
and half to come.”43 Finally, “[t]hat ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is 
sufficiently evident to one who reflects upon the matter.”44 
 These final two propositions – that the present is half past and half to come and that 
ideas cannot be connected without continuity – are the ones Postema endorses. I don’t 
attribute the rest of Peirce’s metaphysical baggage to Postema, for he explicitly distances 
himself from it.45 For my part, I find it too much to swallow, at once confusing and 
confused.46 The existence of actual infinitesimals seems like a conjecture that can neither be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See generally C. S. Peirce, The Law of Mind, in 1 The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings 
(1867-1893) 312 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds. 1992). 
40 Id. at 322. A handful of mathematicians, beginning with Abraham Robinson, developed systems using 
infinitesimals, but the approach has not caught on. ABRAHAM ROBINSON, NON-STANDARD ANALYSIS 
(1966). 
41 Peirce, Immortality, supra note 33, at 2. 
42 Id. 
43 Peirce, The Law of the Mind, supra note 34, at 322. 
44 Id., at 327. 
45 Postema, Jurisprudence, at 23 n. 62. 
46 For example, Peirce seems to ignore that we can prove that the angles of a triangle sum to 180o. Perhaps 
this is because Peirce denigrates deductive proof as “the lowest form of psychical manifestation” – but that 
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verified nor falsified; as Peirce understands them, after all, infinitesimals are by definition too 
small to detect! 
 Furthermore, they aren’t as much help to the historian or philosopher as Peirce 
seemed to suppose. Consider once again Peirce’s example of a red surface adjacent to a blue 
surface. Peirce finds continuity between them, mediated through their infinitesimally narrow 
boundary. Couldn’t we equally well conclude that they are a perfect example of a sharp 
break? An infinitesimally small band of continuity is, for all practical purposes, a line of 
discontinuity. 
 My biggest problem is that synechism needlessly takes sides in a historiographical 
controversy. Some historians emphasize continuities between eras that seem quite different, 
for example the middle ages and the early modern age. Others emphasize rupture and 
discontinuity. For example, Thomas Kuhn’s historiography of science contrasts periods of 
normal science with relatively abrupt paradigm changes – the discontinuities.47 Michel 
Foucault describes an “archaeological” style of history that has as its consequence that “the 
notion of discontinuity assumes a major role in the historical disciplines.”48 Foucault rightly 
dates this turn toward discontinuity back to Marx.49 It may go back further – it was Hegel 
who first emphasized that gradual changes in quantity can pass a threshold into changes of 
quality.50 Where synechism emphasizes the gradual quantitative changes, Hegel would 
respond that this overlooks the qualitative breaks. 
 Postema advocates synechism solely as a corrective to the “separatist” orientation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is because he wrongly conflates deducing B from A with the idea of A causing the idea of B in one’s mind, 
which Peirce likens to a reflex, similar to the way a frog’s severed leg responds to a pinch. Id. 
47 THOMAS S KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (2012). 
48 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 8 (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972). 
49 Id. at 11-12. 
50 1 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC 389 (W. H. Johnston & L. G. Struthers trans., 
1929). 
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of jurisprudence he is criticizing, not as a critique of the historiography of discontinuity.51 
Rightly so: it is a mistake to identify a historiography of discontinuity with separatism. 
Whatever else Kuhn, Foucault, and Marx are, they are not philosophy-phobic analysts of 
professional concepts. Nevertheless, Postema also adds that “the initial tentative response 
to encountering new phenomena should be synechist, which, however, can be silenced in 
the face of strong evidence of genuine discontinuity.”52 Here, it seems, he does take sides 
in the historiographical debate. 
 My example of the red and blue regions suggests that synechism need not be a choice 
as substantive as Postema and Peirce suggest. Indeed, we can see this in Postema’s earlier 
paper where he introduced the melody metaphor. Describing how agents integrate intentions 
into plans, Postema writes:  
The intention-plan need not be (and typically should not be) rigidly fixed. Present 
circumstances may force her to adjust, or even abandon, the plan. … It may also 
force adjustment if past actions were ill-considered or ineptly executed and so 
may fail to fit with the agent’s original sense of her plan. …. When it comes to 
intentional action, we might say, continuity with the past is not a duty, but it is a 
necessity.53 
Postema is right that plans may be abandoned as well as pursued, but he seems to regard 
abandonment as “continuity with the past.” On this view continuity includes not only 
persisting in a course of action, but also abandoning it, or backtracking and starting over. 
Ordinarily, we might think of these as cases of discontinuity, not continuity. Abandoning 
a plan is continuous with the plan only in the minimum sense of temporal succession. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Postema, Jurisprudence, at 23 n. 62. 
52 Id. 
53 Postema, Melody, at 210. 
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don’t deny that this is a coherent sense of continuity: in mathematics, a hockey-stick-
shaped function with a kink in it is continuous even at the inflection point (the kink). But 
at the inflection point the function goes off in a different direction, and that matters. To 
emphasize the function’s continuity is not false, but it is not sufficient. It is certainly not 
sufficient in legal history. Suppose, for example, we accept Maine’s famous thesis of a 
shift from status to contract within the law. A synechist might show that the change was 
gradual, and that even in the age of status there were always elements of contract and 
vice-versa. No doubt these are important corrections to the record – but they don’t bear 
on whether, when the smoke clears, status-based law has changed qualitatively to 
contract-based law. Synechism tells only half the story. 
Conclusion 
 Let me conclude by recapitulating my main points. Overall, I agree with 
Postema’s critique of contemporary Anglophone jurisprudence, and I greatly admire the 
elegance of his argument. Postema’s melody metaphor makes the most sense, I have 
suggested, as a thesis about conceptual change associated with a “meaning as use” theory 
of language. This seems to me a more secure and defensible anchor for his argument than 
Peirce’s metaphysical speculations about infinitesimals and the “law of mind.” As for the 
plea for synechism in the form of continuity-based explanations of legal phenomena, I 
think it is innocuous but nearly empty if “continuity” includes major qualitative changes 
like sharp kinks in history. If it means something stronger, I fear it imposes an 
unjustifiable constraint on how we write and understand history. 
